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The World Wide Web has spread knowledge and economic opportunity
around the globe, but as Richard A. Spinello observes, its remarkable growth "is
not without its social costs."' The kind of pornography that was once available
only to the most committed searcher is now just a click away from any Internet
user, many of whom are minors. In many developing countries, the drive to train
a new generation in technology skills as a foray into global commerce has
produced an epidemic of pornography addiction that parents have no idea how to
address.
Protecting children from Internet pornography is a global problem without a
global answer. The borderless nature of the Internet makes coordinating
responses extremely difficult. Individual countries are scrambling to find
solutions. To combat pornography and other illegal online action, some countries
*
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are regulating Internet intermediaries such as Internet service providers (ISPs),
information intermediaries such as Google or Blogger, or financial intermediaries
such as credit card companies.2 However, these efforts are not solving the
problem. They are less effective in smaller countries where Internet
intermediaries such as ISPs and financial institutions often do not have a
presence or assets in that country.3 Even larger and more powerful countries have
difficulty controlling illegal online conduct where offenders minimize their
dependence on intermediaries, thereby eliminating a government's means of
regulating them.' Offenders also evade prosecution by "mixing" legal and illegal
conduct.5 Some countries have even fewer methods in place to address abuses in
cyberspace.
Of course, some countries, especially those with totalitarian governments, are
approaching the problem of Internet pornography as merely part of what they see
as a larger issue of Western influence, political dissent, and information control.
By screening out most content, sometimes virtually all foreign Internet sites, and
aggressively enforcing restrictive laws, governments in these countries are
effectively restricting access to Internet pornography. These countries simply
block any possibly questionable site-an approach much simpler than managing
a carefully calibrated regulatory scheme. However, the methods in these
totalitarian countries provide no useful guidance for countries wishing to address
the problem with a scalpel rather than a sledgehammer.
As the country that built and still largely dominates the Internet, the United
States should be a leader in modeling solutions for cyberabuse, a standard bearer
in showing the world that the rule of law, freedom, and respect for values can be
simultaneously balanced, accommodated, and fostered. Unfortunately, the United
States has floundered, falling behind other countries in addressing the problem.6
All but the most limited regulatory efforts in the United States have been poorly
conceived, remain out of touch with technology, or have failed to pass
constitutional scrutiny.7

2. See, e.g.,

JACK

GOLDSMITH

&

TiM

WU,

WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS

OF A

BORDERLESS WORLD 81-84 (2006); see also Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Rebooting Cybertort

Law, 80 WASH. L. REV. 335 (2005). (proposing that Internet service providers (ISPs) have a limited duty of care
to remove or block tortious activities using their services when they have received actual notice of those
activities).
3. GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 2, at 81.
4. Id. at 82.
5. Id. at 83-84 (stating that "mixing" occurs where illegal conduct (e.g., publishing obscene material) is
difficult to distinguish from legal conduct (e.g., publishing news, artistic expression, and sexual education), "so
that a given business ... can only be stopped at the expense of giving up things that government and society
value highly-like artistic expression and an open environment for speech").
6. For further information on the efforts of countries outside the United States to address indecency
online, see Cheryl B. Preston, Offshore Porn is a Flimsy Excuse (forthcoming 2008).
7. For an overview of failed federal efforts to regulate online pornography, see Cheryl B. Preston,
Zoning the Internet: A New Approach to Protecting Children Online, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1417. For a state effort
found to be unconstitutional, see the Pennsylvania Solution discussed in Jonathan Zittrain, Internet Points of
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In 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the Communications Decency
Act (CDA).8 Congress responded by passing the Child Online Protection Act
(COPA) to correct the constitutional defects in the CDA. 9 The Supreme Court
found that COPA likely violated the First Amendment because the government
had not meet its burden of proof in showing that less restrictive alternatives
(especially filters) would be less effective.' ° On remand in ACLU v. Gonzales,'
Judge Reed, for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, issued a permanent
injunction against the enforcement of COPA, ruling that COPA was not narrowly
tailored and was not the least restrictive method for enforcing Congress'
compelling interest." The treatment of the CDA and COPA in the courts
illustrate the struggle to develop regulatory strategies to protect children while
maintaining robust Internet access. The United States has been unable to respond
appropriately and provide a model for the rest of the globe for an intelligent
balance of safety and privacy, adult and child use.
One argument against pushing forward to craft a workable solution is that the
borderless nature of the Internet means adopting a U.S. law would be pointless.
Indeed, because of often contradictory intra- and inter-country regulatory
difficulties, more uniformity and international leadership in Internet regulation is
essential. This paper argues that The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers (ICANN), the administrator of the domain name system (DNS),
may provide some assistance in crafting a global approach these problems.
Although ICANN has resisted involvement in enforcement of some kinds of
Internet regulations, ICANN and other entities in the DNS that ICANN
supervises, known as registrars and registries, and the contractual obligations
among those entities, may provide a means of enforcing national laws regulating
online conduct.
In Part I, this article first provides a brief background on the history and
structure of ICANN and then illustrates that, despite its claims to the contrary, 3
ICANN does now make and implement policy in non-technical areas of Internet
governance. This article then examines how ICANN structures and obligations
within the DNS have been used to implement those policy objectives. Second, we
describe a piece of ICANN's extant policy structure that can be meaningfully
engaged in helping countries carry out reasonable pornography regulation. This

Control, 44 B.C. L. REV. 653 (2003); Jim Hu, Court Strikes Down Pennsylvania Porn Law, CNET NEWS, Sept.
10, 2004, http://news.com.com/Court+strikes+down+Pennsylvania+porn+law/2100-1028-3-5361999. tml. . For
the district court's 109 page memorandum opinion, see Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d
606 (E.D. Pa. 2004),availableat http:llwww. dt.org/speech/pennwebblock/20040910memorandum.pdf.
8.

Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).

9.

Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004).

10.

Id. at 666-69, 673.

11. 478 F. Supp. 2d 775 (2007). The case has been appealed to the Third Circuit, Docket Number 072539 (filed May 25, 2007).
12.

478 F. Supp. at 778-79.

13.

See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
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approach does not require radical changes in national or global law or Internet
structure; instead, it enables governments to enforce existing pornography laws
that have been difficult to enforce because of the Internet's borderless nature.
This approach, discussed in Part II, is based on the existing language in
ICANN-mandated agreements. We describe how this language, and the even
more extensive language adopted by ICANN-authorized registrars, registries and
ISPs, establishes the legal basis for carrying out the enforcement of laws
regulating the Internet. We then detail how this approach can be implemented in
the United States under existing rules on jurisdiction and the reach of injunctions.
I. ICANN CAN AND DOES Now MAKE POLICY
Because ICANN was formed and enabled through a series of agreements
involving the U.S. government and other Internet administrators, rather than by
statute, the process took many complex and confusing turns. 4 We include only a
brief overview here. Before ICANN's creation, domain name administration was
performed by Network Solutions Inc. (NSI), a U.S. government contractor based
in Virginia. 5 In February 1998, the U.S. government began privatizing the
management of domain names in a proposed regulation commonly known as the
"Green Paper."'' 6 Then, instead of making the Green Paper a final ruling, the
administration issued a nonbinding statement of policy known as the "White
Paper" in June 1998. The White Paper called for a private entity to contract with
the Department of Commerce (DoC) to administer the DNS."
A short time later, the U.S. government announced that ICANN was the
entity contemplated in the White Paper. ICANN's relationship with the DoC has
been governed by a Memorandum of Understanding, signed November 25, 1998,
which has been amended and renewed various times over the years. 8 Although
the DoC declared that ICANN should assume certain functions under the White
Paper, government contractors such as NSI continued to perform many of these
functions without acknowledging ICANN's role. To correct this, in 1999, the

14. For a detailed description of this process, see MILTON L. MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT: INTERNET
GOVERNANCE AND THE TAMING OF CYBERSPACE 141-208 (2002); A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in
Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 50-93 (2002); Jeff
Tyson, How Internet Infrastructure Works: A Hierarchy of Networks, HowSTuFFWORKS, http://computer.
owstuffworks.com/intemet-infrastructure 1.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2007).
15. For descriptions of domain name administration fundamentals, see MUELLER, supra note 14, at 3056; Froomkin, supra note 14, at 37-50; Markus M0ller, Who Owns the Internet? Ownership as a Legal Basis
for American Control of the Internet, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 709, 713-19 (2005).
16. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (NTIA), IMPROVEMENT OF
TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT OF INTERNET NAMES AND ADDRESSES, 63 Fed. Reg. 8825 (Feb. 20, 1998),

available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/dnsdrft.htm.
17. Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741 (June 5, 1998), available at
http://www.icann.org/general/white-paper-05jun98.htm.
18. See International Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), ICANN's Major
Agreements and Related Reports, http://icann.org/general/agreements.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2008).
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DoC, ICANN, and NSI signed a series of three agreements in which the DoC
leveraged its power to encourage NSI to acknowledge ICANN and provide
ICANN with financial support.' 9 On September 20, 2006, ICANN and the U.S.
government again renewed their relationship in the form of a Joint Project
Agreement (JPA).2°
ICANN, a not-for-profit organization incorporated in California,2' oversees
the procedures by which domain names are assigned and given access to the
system over which electronic signals are sent on the World Wide Web.22 It
administers the DNS, the system that resolves numerical Internet Protocol (IP)
addresses from alpha-numeric domain names.23 ICANN operates the Internet
Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) that "allocates and maintains unique codes
and numbering systems that are used in the technical standards ("protocols") that
drive the Internet., 24 For example, through the DNS, "192.0.34.163" becomes
"www.icann.org. ' '25 Part of this system involves ICANN supervising registrars
who sell domain names, registries who maintain the databases of domain names,
and regional Internet registries who allocate IP addresses.26 ICANN also
administers the "root" or "root zone file," which is one of the master lists of all
top-level domains (TLDs) and their associated IP addresses.27
As the head of the DNS, ICANN has substantial power over the Internet.
ICANN has used this authority in the past to institute policies protecting
intellectual property rights at the encouragement of the trademark lobby. In
addition, ICANN's dispute resolution policy, the Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy (UDRP), has had a dramatic impact on domain name disputes
and is one of the few (nearly) Internet-wide regulatory policies.
Other aspects of ICANN's governance have not resulted in high profile
policies like the UDRP, but still have significant influence on Internet
management and regulation. For example, ICANN has authority over various
19. See generally Froomkin, supra note 14, at 89-93.
20. NTIA, JOINT PROJECT AGREEMENT (Sept. 25, 2006), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/doma
inname/agreements/jpa/ICANNBoardResolution_09252006.htm.
2 I. ICANN, Articles of Incorporation of Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (Nov.
21, 1998) http://www.icann.org/general/articles.htm.
22. See ICANN, ICANN Information, Mar. 26, 2007, http://icann.org/general/; ICANN, Bylaws for
Internet Corporation For Assigned Names and Numbers, Sec. 1, Feb. 28, 2006, http://www.icann.org/generalU
bylaws.htm#II.
23. For further information about the domain name system (DNS) and its administration, see supra note 15.
24. Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), Introducing IANA, http://iana.org/about/ (last visited
Apr. 7, 2008).
25. ICANN, Welcome to ICANN, http://icann.org/new.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2008).
26. See Charles M. Kozierok, IP Overview and Key Operational Characteristics,TCP/IP Guide,
http://www.tcpipguide.com/free/t-IPOverviewandKeyOperationalCharacteristics.htm
(last visited Dec. 21,
2007) (discussing Internet Protocols (IPs) and their purpose as points of reference); MUELLER, supra note 14, at
188 (noting ICANN's "authority over almost all retail domain name registration"); A. Michael Froomkin &
Mark A. Lemley, ICANN and Antitrust, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 18-20 (2003) (describing the "hierarchical"
structure between ICANN, the registries, and the registrars); see also infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
27. See Froomkin, supra note 14, at 43-47, 89-90.
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entities in the DNS such as generic top-level domain (gTLD) registrars and
registries." It has artificially limited the number of registrars it accredits. ICANN
also chooses which companies "win" the ability to act as registries administering
the domain names in a TLD.2 9 ICANN enters into contracts with these registrars
and registries, and through these contracts, it is able to set technical standards
for these entities.
ICANN's contracts also cover other non-technical obligations of registrars
and registries. For example, ICANN requires registrars to enter into contracts
with domain name registrants that require the registrants to submit to jurisdiction
both where the domain name holder is domiciled and where the registrar is
located.3 This provision has significant non-technical consequences. 32 In
addition, because the provision is uniformly required for all domain name holders
registered with ICANN-accredited registrars, it has significant regulatory utility.
As a result, a country seeking to regulate illegal conduct on the Internet within its
borders may fashion legislation that relies on the uniformity of certain provisions
in ICANN's contracts with entities in the DNS.
ICANN maintains that it does not set non-technical policy. The party line is
that ICANN merely coordinates the technology and ensures stable virtual
architecture. According to Esther Dyson, ICANN "governs the plumbing, not the
people. It has a very limited mandate to administer certain (largely technical)
aspects of the Internet infrastructure in general and the Domain Name System in
particular. The DoC originally called ICANN's function "coordination. 34
However, others claim ICANN is a regulatory institution that wields quasigovernmental power and that engages in policymaking. Some have stated that
28. ICANN also has agreements with the registrars and registries of sponsored top-level domains and
some country-code top-level domains (ccTLDs), but many of these agreements are substantially different from
the agreement with generic top-level domain (gTLD) entities and are not analyzed here.
29. Froomkin & Lemley, supra note 26, at 22-25, 52-56 (criticizing ICANN's artificial logjamming of
new gTLDs and registries and discussing possible antitrust implications).
30. ICANN has contracts with most but not all registrars or registries around the world; for example, it
does not have agreements with most registrars and registries of ccTLDs. See ICANN, ccTLD Agreements, June
6, 2007, http://www.icann.org/cctlds/agreements.html. ICANN is supposed to be working toward obtaining
agreements with these entities. See NTIA, supra note 20, at 5 ("ICANN shall continue its efforts to achieve
stable agreements with ccTLD operators.").
31. ICANN, Registrar Accreditation Agreement, § 3.7.7.10, May 17, 2001, http://www.icann.org/
registrars/ra-agreement- 17may01 .htm#3.
32. See infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
33. Letter from Esther Dyson to Ralph Nadar and Jamie Love (June 15, 1999), quoted in MUELLER,
supra note 14, at 8.
34. Management of Internet Domain Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741, 31,744 (June 5, 1998),
available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/6-5-98dns.htm ("Under the Green Paper proposal,
the U.S. Government would gradually transfer these coordination functions to the new corporation"); Froomkin,
supra note 14, at 95.
35. See Milton L. Mueller, Why ICANN Can't, IEEE SPECTRUM 15, 15 (July 2002); see also Froomkin,
supra note 14, at 94-105; David Post, Governing Cyberspace, June 6, 1999, http://www.icannwatch.
org/archive/governing-cyberspace.htm (noting some of ICANN's actions are "already way beyond the realm of
technical 'standards-setting' and involve "global Internet policy").
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its mandate from the DoC to administer the DNS is analogous to that of the U.S.
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which few would argue engages
only in technical coordination.36
Perhaps initially administering the DNS was simply a matter of technical
coordination, when all it required was the one-person job of recording all the
domain names and numbers in a single notebook. However, when domain name
registration exploded under the oversight of NSI in the 1990's, the job quickly
became more than technical coordination. An example of this development
occurred in July 1995 when NSI became involved in its first trademark lawsuit.
To avoid being involved in such suits in the future, NSI issued a "Domain
Dispute Resolution Policy Statement" to address disputes regarding domain
names and their registration.37
ICANN took over various Internet governance functions previously
performed by NSI in the late 1990s, and as the Internet has grown, ICANN's
policy, gate-keeping, and business-opportunity functions have increased. For
example, ICANN caps the cost of registering a domain name.3" It has taken a
policy stand on the demand for domain names by controlling the number of new
TLDs.3 9 Similarly, ICANN accredits a limited number of registrars, creating
competition among prospective and existing registrars in what has become an
extremely lucrative business.40 It also determines which companies receive
certain types of economic opportunities, such as being a registry over an existing
or new group of domain names.'
ICANN prescribes many of the key contractual provisions that registrars
must impose on all new applicants for domain names, and ICANN also requires
modification of existing contracts to include the provisions.42 It requires domain
name holders to submit to an accelerated arbitration process pursuant to the
UDRP to determine the scope of a party's trademark rights.43 ICANN determines
the scope of domain name holders' personal privacy rights by setting policies for
what personal information a registrar collects from domain name applicants

36. See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 35, at 16.
MUELLER, supra note 14, at 120.
38. See Mueller, supra note 35, at 16.
39. See id. ("ICANN ...controls the supply of [domain] names by accepting or rejecting applications
for top-level domains (.com, .net, and the like)").
40. See ICANN, Accreditation Overview, Mar. 26, 2007, http://www.icann.org/registrars/accreditation.
htm.
41. See ICANN, Registry Services Evaluation Process, Mar. 26, 2007, http://www.icann.org/registries/
rsep/.
42. Froomkin, supra note 14, at 97.
43. See infra text accompanying notes 47-59; see also Mueller, supra note 35, at 16; Froomkin, supra
note 14, at 101 (noting that the UDRP "represents a clear policy choice to sacrifice the interest of (some)
domain name registrants in favor of (some) trademark registrants for the communal good"); Jonathan Weinberg,
ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187, 216 (2000) (describing the implementation of the
UDRP as "command-and-control regulation").
37.
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under ICANN's WHOIS policy." It sets technical standards for the administration of registration databases and the sharing of information among other DNS
coordinating bodies. Milton Mueller illustrates that "ICANN's decisions directly
affect numerous interest groups: consumers of domain name services, trademark
holders, civil liberties advocates, existing registries and their would-be
competitors, law-enforcement agencies, would-be censors, and foreign
governments.,' 45 Finally, it has in fact, chosen to become involved, although not
effectively, in the issues of adult content on the Internet and methods of
46
protecting children from such content.
Perhaps the most influential interest group for whom ICANN has made
policy is trademark holders. Trademark holders were involved in the dialogue
that shaped Internet governance almost from the beginning, playing a role in NSI
decisions and then becoming central to the creation of ICANN and ICANN's
UDRP. 7 NSI created a trademark dispute resolution policy before ICANN was
conceived." Trademark holders were present in a series of conferences and
workshops that in 1995 and 1996 on Internet administration and coordination.
They objected to a proposal known as "draft-postel," which would have added
more TLDs. The trademark holders enlisted the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office and the DoC to help them argue that ignoring trademarks in relation to
Internet governance would negatively impact commerce. 41
IBM and AT&T, big businesses heavily invested in Internet development,
withheld their support from an alternative proposal to the Green Paper developed
by the International Ad-Hoc Committee (IAHC) because of trademark concerns.5
These companies and others were also key players in bringing together 5a
"dominant coalition" that negotiated what became known as the White Paper, '
that led to enabling ICANN.
The White Paper authorized the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO), "an entity entirely beholden to intellectual property owners, 52 to
propose a policy for handling trademark disputes. Since the time of the IAHC
proposals, trademark interests had lobbied for a domain name management that
was directly linked to trademark protection, centralizing the policing and

44. ICANN, Whois Services, Mar. 26, 2007, http://icann.org/topics/whois-services/; ICANN, Public
Participation Page, Whois Information Page, http://public.icann.org/whois (last visited July 5, 2007) ("'Whois'
refers to the information that is required whenever anyone registers a domain name ... .
45. Mueller, supra note 35, at 16.
46. ICANN recently considered and then rejected an application to create a gTLD, .xxx, exclusively for
adult content. See ICANN, Board Rejects XXX Domain Application, Mar. 30, 2007, http://www.icann.org/
announcements/announcement-30mar07.htm.
47. See generally MUELLER, supra note 14, at 73-208.
48. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
49.

MUELLER, supra note 14, at 137-39, 156.

50.
51.
52.

Id. at 142-46, 154-60, 168-71.
Id. at 168-75.
Id. at 190.
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enforcement of trademark holders' rights and shifting the transactions costs away
from themselves.53 The trademark interests attempted to implement this objective
through WIPO, which initiated a consultation process to gather suggestions on
trademark disputes. 4 WIPO's December 1998 interim report attempted to secure
the strongest intellectual property protection imaginable.5 It included, for
example, the WHOIS database, which "offered... automated and centralized
surveillance of registration records" and "offered administrators the leverage for
effective and inexpensive enforcement: the withdrawal of the domain name. 56
Based on the strong negative response from civil rights groups, academics, and
others, WIPO revised its proposal and submitted a more modest report, but the
report still contained a pro-trademark holder bias.57
Trademark holders have continued as an influential voice in the development
of ICANN's policies. As Michael Palage, the head of the Registrars' Domain
Name Supporting Organization (DNSO) Constituency, famously noted, "[t]he
trademark lobby must be placated because of its potential ability and inclination
to bankrupt new registrars and wreak havoc on their registrant databases."58 The
DoC and ICANN heeded the trademark lobby by making the introduction of new
TLDs a low priority relative to other goals. When new TLDs were eventually
approved, "sunrise" or "daybreak" procedures accompanied the new TLDs,
allowing trademark holders the opportunity to register their names before the
public. 59 These procedures illustrate how trademark holders affected the policies
of ICANN during its development.
ICANN listened to and incorporated the concerns of trademark and
intellectual property owners from the beginning. But its tie to these groups did
not end there. Through 1998 and most of 1999, NSI's refusal to recognize
ICANN prevented ICANN from receiving revenues from new registrars under its
shared registration system, which would have introduced competition in
registration by adding additional registrars. 60 Because it did not receive revenues
as planned, ICANN had no financial support and went deeply into debt. 6, The
benefactors who bailed ICANN out were, of course, the corporate interests who

53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 190-91.
56. Id. Among those opposed to the report were "domain name registries, organizations representing the
Internet technical community, civil liberties groups, and many individual domain name holders." Id.
57. See id. at 192-93.
58. Judith Oppenheimer, Beware Slippery Slopes AKA Be Careful What You Wish For... http://www.
judithoppenheimer.com/pressetc/adentive.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2008) (quoting a remark by Palage at a
January 10, 2000 meeting of the Small Business Administration on domain name issues).
59. MUELLER, supra note 14, at 193.
60. Id. at 194-95.
61. Id. at 195.
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held the largest stake in ICANN's survival. For instance, MCI loaned ICANN
$500,000, and Cisco Systems loaned it $150,000.62
In summary, ICANN's policies, especially the UDRP, were the product of
input by many economic interest groups, including in particular large corporations with huge economic stakes in protecting their trademarks and intellectual
property.63 Their lobbying efforts are plainly evident in the policies that ICANN
developed early on, the objectives the DoC designed it to fulfill, and the path
ICANN has pursued since its creation. Many of ICANN's decisions reflect
distinct policy choices that protect trademark holders in opposition to the
interests of domain name registries, the Internet technical community, civil
liberties groups, individual domain name holders, foreign governments, and the
public generally. 64 In fact, interest groups representing the general public were
clearly missing from the table when these initial policy decisions were made. The
general public at that time had little understanding of the Internet, its potential for
good and for ill, and although this group has a huge stake in what the Internet
becomes and allows, it has none of the economic and lobbying power already
entrenched in the ICANN system by well-financed trademark and intellectual
property owners.
Because ICANN has been the instrument for maintaining various public
policies since its inception, there is no justification for its current argument that it
does not make "policy," and that it can't be both socially responsible and
economically driven. Given that reality, this paper suggests a possible avenue by
which the obligations contained in ICANN's contracts can contribute
meaningfully to the enforcement of pornography laws on the Internet.
II. ICANN CAN AND DOES REQUIRE CONTRACT PROVISIONS

ICANN already has in place an elaborate structure of contracts and
memorandums of understanding, as well as informal agreements, with many of
the actors in the Internet hierarchy. These agreements give ICANN considerable
power and also provide a mechanism for uniform Internet regulation of gTLDs.
As governments become increasingly concerned about the easy availability of
Internet pornography within their boundaries, these contractual obligations and
relationships will have increasing importance. In addition, because these
contractual obligations suggest ways that court orders can be used to control
pornography on the Internet, we will also examine in this section issues of
jurisdiction and the enforcement of court orders in Subpart B.

62. James Niccolai, ICANN Survives on Corporate Dole, INDUSTRY STANDARD, Aug. 20, 1999,
available at http://thestandard.com/article/0,1902,6037,00.html.
63. MUELLER, supra note 14, at 166-67 tbl. 8.1.
64. See, e.g., supra note 56 (listing parties who opposed the World Intellectual Property Organization's
(WIPO) interim report).
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A.

ContractualRights and Duties Derivingfrom ICANN and its Affiliates

ICANN requires that all accredited registrars incorporate the UDRP by
reference into all registration agreements with domain name holders. 6 The
UDRP was established by ICANN and has been adopted by all accredited
domain name registrars of all gTLDs, 66 and a few domain name registrars of
country-code top-level domains (ccTLDs). 67 The UDRP provides that a registrar
will cancel, transfer, or make other changes to domain name registrations upon
receipt of a court order. The relevant provision provides:
3. Cancellations, Transfers, and Changes. We will cancel, transfer or
otherwise make changes to domain name registrations under the
following circumstances:

b. our receipt of an order from a court or arbitral tribunal, in each
case of competent jurisdiction, requiring such action; and/or
c. our receipt of a decision of an Administrative Panel requiring such
action in any administrative proceeding to which you were a party and
which was conducted under this Policy or a later version of this Policy
adopted by ICANN....
The policy is incorporated by reference into the registration agreement
between a registrar and a domain name holder.6 9 In other words, "we" in the
quote above refers to the registrar and "you" refers to the domain name holder.
ICANN is not a party to this contract.70

65. The Registrar Accreditation Agreement between accredited registrars and ICANN provides as
follows:
3.8 Domain-Name Dispute Resolution. During the Term of this Agreement, Registrar shall have in
place a policy and procedures for resolution of disputes concerning Registered Names. Until
different policies and procedures are established by ICANN under Section 4, Registrar shall comply
with the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy identified on ICANN's website ....
ICANN, Registrar Accreditation Agreement, May 17, 2001, http://www.icann.orglregistrars/ra-agreement17may01 .htm.
66. ICANN, Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policies, Sept. 11, 2007, http://www.icann.org/udrp/
(noting that the UDRP "has been adopted by ICANN-accredited registrars in all gTLDs (.aero, .biz, cat, .com,
.coop, .info, jobs, .mobi, museum, name, net, .org, pro, tel and .travel).").
67. ICANN, Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, Oct. 24, 1999 http://www.icann.org/
dndr/udrp/policy.htm, at Note 2 (noting that the UDRP has been adopted by "certain managers of ccTLDs (e.g.,
.nu, .tv, .ws).").
68. Id. 3.
69. Id. I I ("This Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy... is incorporated by reference
into your Registration Agreement .... ).
70. Id. at Note 3 ("The policy is between the registrar (or other registration authority in the case of a
country-code top-level domain) and its customer (the domain-name holder or registrant). Thus, the policy uses
'we' and 'our' to refer to the registrar and it uses 'you' and 'your' to refer to the domain-name holder.")
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Some might argue that the language of Paragraph 3(b) only applies to
trademark disputes. However, when the UDRP is read as a whole, the separation
of the arbitration provisions in Paragraph 4 of the policy from the contract
requirements in Paragraph 3 makes clear that Paragraph 3 refers to disputes
generally. Subparagraph 3(b) provides in plain language that a registrar will
cancel, suspend, or transfer a domain name solely upon receipt of an order of a
court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction.
Under the UDRP and relevant case law, courts of "competent" jurisdiction
include those authorized by a government to adjudicate the claims brought before
them.' Thus, if a U.S. court finds that material on the web is illegal-for
instance, child pornography or unprotected obscenity-the court may issue an
order requiring that the material be taken down or that the website be forfeited.
When served with this order, the registrar "will cancel, transfer or otherwise
make changes to domain name registrations. 72
Other contractual provisions also illustrate that registrars may suspend or
transfer a domain name upon receipt of a court order. The following provision in
the registrar accreditation agreement between accredited registrars and ICANN
requires that the registrar include certain provisions in its registration agreements
with registered name holders:
3.7.7 Registrar shall require all Registered Name Holders to enter into an
electronic or paper registration agreement with Registrar including at
least the following provisions:

3.7.7.11 The Registered Name Holder shall agree that its registration of
the Registered Name shall be subject to suspension, cancellation, or
transfer pursuant to any ICANN adopted specification or policy, or
pursuant to any registrar or registry procedure not inconsistent with an
ICANN adopted specification or policy... (2) for the resolution of
disputes concerning the Registered Name.73
These provisions could be read very narrowly so that a dispute over the
content of a particular website might not be considered a dispute "concerning the
registered name." However, the language equally lends itself to being read more
broadly to refer to any dispute that involves the domain name, so that disputes
over the content of the site would be included as well.

71. See Storey v. Cello Holdings, L.L.C., 347 F.3d 370, 380 (2d Cir. 2003) ("As the UDRP provides no
definition for 'court of competent jurisdiction' as a term of art, we give the term its plain meaning, namely a
court that has jurisdiction to hear the claim brought before it.").
72. See ICANN, supra note 67, at 3 (emphasis added).
73. ICANN, Registrar Accreditation Agreement, § 3.7.7.11, May 17, 2001, http://www.icann.org/
registrars/ra-agreement- 17may01.htm#3 (emphasis added).
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Similar language appears in the contracts between customers and other
parties in the DNS. For instance, Go Daddy, a large accredited registrar located
in the United States uses a provision very similar to the above language in
Another accredited registrar,
ICANN's accredited registrar agreement.
00Domain.com, uses even stronger language regarding power to cancel domain
names. 5 Its contract includes the following:
16.2 Domain suspension, cancellation or transfer. You acknowledge and
agree that your domain registration is subject to suspension, cancellation
or transfer (cancellation or transfer collectively referred to as,
"Cancellation") ... (b) for the resolution of disputes concerning the
domain pursuant to an ICANN policy or procedure. You also agree that

00ODomains shall have the right in its sole discretion to suspend, cancel,
transferor otherwise modify a domain registration.., after such time as
00ODomains receives a properly authenticated order from a court of
competent jurisdiction, or arbitrationaward, requiring the suspension,
cancellation,transfer or modification of the domain registration.
16.3 Termination. 00ODomains reserves the right to suspend, cancel,
transfer or modify your domain registration if. . . . (b) you use the
domain to send Unsolicited Email, in violation of this Agreement or
unlawful
applicable laws;76 (c) yOU use your domain
77 in connection with

activity; or (d) you violate this Agreement.

This language gives wide latitude to the registrar to unilaterally suspend or
terminate a domain name. Subsection 16.3(c) certainly covers the use of the
domain to publish currently illegal content such as obscenity or child
pornography.
More importantly, these provisions demonstrate that an accredited registrar
can, through its own contract initiative (or in conformity to a contractual

74. Go Daddy Software Inc., Go Daddy Domain Registration Agreement, Nov. 1, 2006,
http://www.godaddy.corm/gdshop/legal-agreements/show-doc.asp?pageid=REGSA.
6. suspension of services: breach of agreement. You agree that, in addition to other events set forth
in this agreement, (i) Your ability to use any of the services provided by Go Daddy is subject to
cancellation or suspension in the event there is an unresolved breach of this agreement and/or
suspension or cancellation is required by any policy now in effect or adopted later by ICANN, and
(ii) Your registration of any domain names shall be subject to suspension, cancellation or transfer
pursuant to any ICANN adopted specification or policy, or pursuant to any Go Daddy procedure not
inconsistent with an ICANN adopted specification or policy, (I) to correct mistakes by Go Daddy or
the registry operator in registering any domain name or (2) for the resolution of disputes concerning
any domain name.
17.2, Nov. 15, 2006, https://secure.registerapi.
75. See 000Domains.com, Registration Agreement,
comlorder/register/agreement.php?siteid=35427 [hereinafter 000Domains.com, Registration Agreement].
76. This appears to refer to violations of the CAN-SPAM Act, Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699
(2003) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701-13; 18 U.S.C. 1001, 1037; 28 U.S.C. § 994; and 47 U.S.C. § 227).
77. 00ODomains.com, Registration Agreement, supra note 75. (emphasis added).
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requirement from ICANN), draft provisions stricter than the current ICANN
requirements. Section 16.3(d) of the 00ODomains contract permits the registrar to
suspend, cancel, or transfer a registrant's domain name if the registrant
"violate[s] th[e] Agreement." In addition, the agreement incorporates present and
future ICANN and registrar policies by reference.78
Using even more aggressive language, another registrar, Tucows, reserves the
right to act solely upon receiving notice of the filing of a complaint regarding the
domain name. 79 The contract provides:
If Tucows is notified that a complaint has been filed with a judicial or
administrative body regarding your domain name, Tucows may, at its
sole discretion, suspend your ability to use your domain name or to make
modifications to your registration records until (i) Tucows is directed to
do so by the judicial or administrative body, or (ii) Tucows receives
notification by you and the other party contesting your domain that the
dispute has been settled. Furthermore, you agree that if you are subject to
litigation regarding your registration or use of your domain name,
Tucows may deposit control of your registration record into the registry
of the judicial body by supplying a party with a registrar certificate from
us.

80

In the first sentence, the operative description of the litigation is "regarding your
domain name." In the second sentence, that category seems to be broken down
further into "litigation regarding your registration or use of your domain name,"
suggesting that the provision is broad enough to govern website content.
This kind of language is currently being used to shut down websites based on
content. For instance, the world's largest registrar, Go Daddy, recently suspended
a website based on the website's content relying on authority from its terms of
service agreement, which is an agreement separate from its registration
agreement. Its service agreement allows Go Daddy to take down a site for any
reason." In that case, MySpace alleged that thousands of its users' passwords and
78. Id. ("To complete the registration process, you must acknowledge that you have read, understood,
and agree to be bound by... any registration rules or policies that are or may be published from time to time by
O000Domains, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN") and/or any and all of the
registry administrators.").
79. See Tucows Reseller Contract, http://resellers.tucows.com/contracts/tld/exhibita (last visited Feb. 13,
2007).
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. See Declan McCullagh, GoDaddy Pulls Security Site After MySpace Complaints, CNET.com, Jan.
25, 2007, http://news.com.com/2100-1025-3-6153607.html?part=rss&tag=2547-1023-3-0-5&subj=news;
Go
Daddy, Go Daddy Universal Terms of Service for Go Daddy Software and Services, Feb. 19, 2007,
https://www.godaddy.congdshop/agreements.asp?ci=29 I. The relevant language provides:
As a condition of Your use of Go Daddy 's Software and Services, You agree not to use
them for any purpose that is unlawful or prohibited by these terms and conditions, and
You agree to comply with any applicable local, state, federal and international laws,
government rules or requirements. You agree You will not be entitled to a refund of any
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usernames had been archived on Seclists.org, and demanded that Go Daddy
suspend the Seclists.org site. Go Daddy complied with MySpace's request and,
"[t]o protect the MySpace users from potentially having private information
revealed[,]" suspended the site until the password list had been removed-a
duration of approximately seven hours." Go Daddy indicated that it frequently
removes domain names based on website content, utilizing a "24-hour abuse
department that deletes domain names used for sparn or child pornography on a
daily basis. 83
The contractual terms discussed in this section illustrate that (1) ICANN has
strong bargaining power vis-i-vis registrars and registrants, such that ICANN is
able to mandate the use of specific contractual language; (2) the existing
language in ICANN-mandated contracts is sufficient to require suspension of a
website upon receipt of a court order arising from anti-pornography laws; (3)
both ICANN and accredited registrars already contractually notify registrants of
the possibility that domain names may be cancelled; and (4) both ICANN and
accredited registrars could set standards and enforcement procedures by contract
with domain name owners who publish pornography.
While the use of court orders seems straightforward, there are several issues
we must explore concerning the efficacy of using court orders to assist in
regulating Internet pornography. Clearly, questions of standards and mechanics
will arise. In Subpart B, we address some of the practical and administrative
issues that relate to the use of court orders to regulate web content, including
jurisdiction and the reach of a court order.
B.

Jurisdictionand Enforcement Issues

Understanding the contractual rights and duties among players in the DNS
provides lawmakers and interest groups with a framework around which to craft
legislation to regulate pornographic material the Internet. First, such interested
parties should maximize the use of existing legislation that allows a private party
or public official to obtain a court order requiring material to be taken off the

fees paid to Go Daddy if, for any reason, Go Daddy takes corrective action with respect
to Your improper or illegal use of its Services.
....Go Daddy reserves the right to review Your use of the Services and to cancel the
Services in its sole discretion. Go Daddy reserves the right to terminate Your access to
the Services at any time, without notice,for any reason whatsoever.
Go Daddy reserves the right to terminate Services if Your usage of the Services results in,
or is the subject of, legal action or threatened legal action, against Go Daddy or any of its
affiliates or partners, without consideration for whether such legal action or threatened
legal action is eventually determined to be with or without merit.
Id. § A.5 (emphasis added).
82. McCullagh, supra note 81 (quoting Go Daddy general counsel Christine Jones).
83. Id.
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web. Interested parties should also maximize the use of legislation that allows a
domain name or distribution scheme to be forfeited when it is used to violate law.
In the United States, statutes following this model, which permit the
disabling of the means used to carry out illegal activity, already exist in various
contexts that could be compared to the regulation of pornography. For instance,
under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), courts may impound any
device or product related to the copyright violation, and grant injunctions ' or
"order remedial modification or destruction of a violating device or product. 's4
Similarly, the 2003 Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and
Marketing (CANSPAM) Act provides that an offender forfeits "any equipment,
software, or other technology used or intended to be used to commit or to
facilitate the commission of such offense. 85
In countries without such legislation aimed directly at online pornography,
the political push should be to convince legislatures to adopt provisions that
proscribe certain forms of pornography and explicitly or implicitly empower a
court, or other tribunal, to issue a cease-and-desist type order. Legislation should
be drafted to provide, among other remedies, the express power of a court to
issue an order for a site to be taken down if it is being used to publish illegal
pornographic material.
Unfortunately, because of the borderless nature of the Internet, lawsuits
involving Internet actors may not be as simple as a lawsuit against a hard-copy,
geographically-bounded pornographer. In drafting new legislation, proponents
should be aware of two potential problems: (1) obtaining jurisdiction over
domain names and domain name holders, and (2) establishing the injunctive
reach of a court's order. What follows is a discussion of these two issues under
U.S. law. We do not undertake here to discuss the jurisdiction regimes in other
countries or international choice of law rules.
1. Jurisdiction
For a court to hear a case, make a binding ruling, and then issue an order
enjoining the continued availability of a website, the court must have jurisdiction
over the person or the thing-the person who controls the website or the site
itself. Generally, these will be respectively a domain name holder and the domain
name itself. The preferred basis for jurisdiction is in personam,6 and we address
it first, followed by in rem jurisdiction.
84. 17 U.S.C. § 1203 (2000).
85. 18 U.S.C. § 1037.
86. We note that federal courts begin analyzing personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants by
looking to the state long-arm statute of the state where the court sits. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A). Many
states, although not all states, attempt to assert personal jurisdiction to the fullest extent allowed by due process.
See 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1068 (3d ed.
2002). We will only analyze the constitutional limitations on personal jurisdiction here and leave a more
complete analysis of long-arm statutes to a future article.
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Under U.S. law, the personal jurisdictional issues are slightly different for
three classes of domain name holders: domestic registrants, foreign registrants
registered with a U.S.-based registrar, and foreign registrants registered with a
foreign-based registrar. It is important to note the difference between registrars
and registries. Registrars are entities that sell domain names retail to the public.
Registries, on the other hand, include entities that administer a TLD." A distinct
type of registry is a regional internet registry that assigns domain names to
numbers. Collectively, these entities are responsible for the allocation,
registration, and administration of IP numbers within a specific geographic
location. 9 Regional Internet registries focus on technical aspects of coordinating
IP address allocation.
a. Domestic Registrants
For purposes of jurisdiction, the first category of domain name registrants (or
owners) is those domiciled in the United States. These domain name holders are
subject to in personam jurisdiction in the state and federal courts in the districts
where they are domiciled. They are also subject to jurisdiction in the state or
federal court of every state in which they have minimum contacts that satisfy due
90
process.
b.

ForeignRegistrants Registered With a Domestic Registrar

The second category of domain name holders is foreign entities who register
with a U.S.-based registrar. The ICANN Registrar Accreditation Agreement
requires that a registrar compel a domain name holder to submit to jurisdiction
both where the registered name holder is domiciled and where the registrar is
located. 9' A literal reading of this agreement subjects any domain name holder,
whether domiciled in the United States or not, who registers its domain name
through a U.S.-based registrar, to jurisdiction where the registrar is located. Even

87. For a list of registrars accredited by ICANN, see ICANN, ICANN-Accredited Registrars,
http://www.icann.org/registrars/accredited-list.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2008).
88. For a list of registries, see ICANN, Registry Listing, http://www.icann.org/registries/listing. html
(last visited Mar. 27, 2008).
89. Early on it was decided that the management of domain names should be separate from the
management of IP numbers. Daniel Karrenberg et al., Development of the Regional Internet Registry System, 4
INTERNET PROTOCOL J. 17 (Dec. 2001), available at http://www.cisco.com/ web/about/acl23/ac147/archived
_issues/ipj_4-4/regional-intemet-registries.html.
90. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), and its progeny; see also GEOFFREY
C. HAZARD ET AL., PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 163-346 (9th ed. 2005).
91. ICANN, Registrar Accreditation Agreement, § 3.7.7.10, May 17, 2001, http://www.icann.org/
registrars/ra-agreement-17may0l.htm#3. The provision provides in full: "3.7.7.10. For the adjudication of
disputes concerning or arising from use of the Registered Name, the Registered Name Holder shall submit,
without prejudice to other potentially applicable jurisdictions, to the jurisdiction of the courts (1) of the
Registered Name Holder's domicile and (2) where Registrar is located." Id.
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under a narrow reading of the agreement, foreign registrants who have minimum
contacts with the United States would also be subject to jurisdiction. 92
c. Foreign Registrants of a Domain Name Registered With a Foreign
Registrar
A third category is domain name holders who are foreign registrants who
register their domain names through foreign registrars. Normally, U.S. courts are
unable to exercise jurisdiction over these foreign registrants because they do not
have sufficient minimum contacts here. However, U.S. courts could exercise
jurisdiction over foreign registrants of a domain name in a gTLD administered in
the United States if Congress passed a statute with a jurisdictional scheme similar
to the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA). 93 Alternatively, U.S.
courts may exercise jurisdiction over such registrants without new legislation
through an in rem civil forfeiture action. We next discuss the ACPA scheme and
then the existing common law options.
(1) In rem jurisdiction under the ACPA. The ACPA provides trademark
holders with civil remedies against defendants who obtain domain names in "bad
faith." 94 Although the ACPA is a trademark statute, it provides a helpful
framework for conceptualizing the jurisdictional issues regarding other violations
of law involving domain names.
Under certain conditions, the ACPA allows a trademark holder to file an in
rem civil action against an infringing website domain name operated by a foreign
registrant in the jurisdiction where the "domain name registrar, domain name
registry, or other domain name authority that registered or assigned the domain
name is located. 9 5 Although the trademark holder cannot ordinarily reach foreign
registrants using a foreign registrar and registry, § 1 125(d)(2)(A) of the ACPA
provides that the trademark holder may file the in rem action in the jurisdiction
where the registrar or registry is located when the trademark holder is not able to
obtain personal jurisdiction over the domain name holder or is unable to find the
holder for service of process, upon a showing of due diligence by sending notice
by e-mail or by posting notice of the action. 96 In practice, this provision permits a
92. This analysis would likely proceed under the Zippo sliding scale test. See Zippo Manufacturing Co.
v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997); see also C. Douglas Floyd & Shima
Baradaran-Robison, Toward a Unified Test of Personal Jurisdiction in an Era of Widely Diffused Wrongs: The

Relevance of Purpose and Effects, 81 IND. L.J. 601, 613-14 (2006) (describing the test and listing the circuits
which have expressed approval for or applied the test).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2006).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 125(d)(l)(A)(i). "Cybersquatting is the Internet version of a land grab. Cybersquatters
register well-known brand names as Internet domain names in order to force the rightful owners of the marks to
pay for the right to engage in electronic commerce under their own name." Interstellar Starship Serv., Ltd. v.
Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 946 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 238 F.3d
264, 267 (4th Cir.2001)).
95. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A).
96. Id.
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U.S. court to obtain jurisdiction over an infringing website when foreign domain
name holders using foreign registrars are unavailable for service of process.
Since almost all unsponsored 97 gTLDs have their headquarters or an office in the
United States, nearly all registrants of domain names in gTLDs are subject to the
ACPA. 9' Passing legislation with an approach similar to the ACPA which
addresses online pornography would simplify many jurisdiction problems.
(2) In rem jurisdiction in a forfeiture action. The online pornography problem
may currently be addressed through existing common law in rem jurisdiction and

forfeiture. 99 For instance, under U.S. obscenity '°° law, "any property, real or
personal, used or intended to be used to commit or to promote the commission of
[an] offense" involving obscene material is subject to criminal and civil
forfeiture.' ° ' Such a seizure action requires a warrant based on a showing of
97. Sponsored top-level domains are more restrictive than other top-level domains because they require
being a member of a specified group or organization. See ICANN, ICANN Top-Level Domains, Mar. 26, 2007,
http://www.icann.org/tlds/.
98. The following table shows where the registries of the unsponsored gTLDs are located as of May
2007.
Registry

Top-Level Domain

Location

NeuLevel

.biz

Sterling, VA

VeriSign

.com

Mountain View, CA

Afilias

info

IANA .int Domain Registry

int

Dublin, Ireland;
Offices in Philadelphia, PA
Marina del Rey, CA

Global Name Registry

name

London, United Kingdom

VeriSign

net

Mountain View, CA

Public Interest Registry (PIR)

org

Reston, VA

RegistryPro, LTD

pro

Chicago, IL

ICANN, Registry Listing, http://www.icann.org/registries/listing.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2008); see also
Afilias, About Afilias, Jan. 14, 2005, http://www.afilias.info/aboutafilias/; Neulevel, Contact Us, http://www.
neulevel.biz/neulevel/contactus/index.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2007); VeriSign, About VeriSign, Contact
VeriSign, http://www.verisign.com/verisign-inc/verisign-contact-information/index.html (last visited June 15,
2007).
99. See Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsche.net, 302 F.3d 248, 260-62 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that 28
U.S.C. § 1655, a lien enforcement statute against absent defendants, does not provide jurisdiction for transfer of
domain names in a trademark dilution action).
100. Obscenity under U.S. law is a limited category of hard-core pornography that falls within the
definition set forth in Miller v. California,and exists where
[T]he average person, applying contemporary community standards would find that the work, taken
as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;.., the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and.., the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
101. 18 U.S.C. § 1467(a), (c) (2000). The government uses civil forfeiture more often because of the
lower burden of proof required and because the offending property may be seized without the full procedural
requirements entailed in a criminal charge or conviction. See United States v. One 1982 Chevrolet Crew-Cab
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probable cause, evidence of the property's involvement (usually as a tool or
instrumentality in the commission of a crime involving obscenity), and a finding
that the material is obscene under U.S. law.' 2
Such an in rem civil forfeiture action requires that the property have a situs
within the United States.'0 3 Courts interpreting the ACPA have held that Congress
intended for domain names to be treated as property and that their situs is in the
location of the registrar or registry that registered or assigned the domain name.""
In a U.S. federal obscenity case, where there is no statutory statement of situs
since
such as in the ACPA, the common law would reach a similar conclusion
names.' 05
domain
control
who
entities
the
are
registries
or
registrars
the
Thus, it may be possible for a U.S. court to assert in rem jurisdiction based
on civil and criminal forfeiture over a domain name controlled by a registrar or
registry within its district without any analysis of whether the registrant's
minimum contacts with the forum satisfy the requirements of personal
jurisdiction.'0 Clearly, this question warrants more complete analysis than we
have room for here; we only provide a brief summary of the common law.
Our conclusion regarding in rem jurisdiction and forfeiture follows from the
continuing viability of the territoriality framework in Pennoyer v. Neff, 07recently
reaffirmed in Burnham v. Superior Court.0 8 In Burnham, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that "jurisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes due process
because it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal system that define the
due process standard of 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.""'
However, U.S, Supreme Court jurisprudence may require that, in the context
of in rem proceedings, a party must still satisfy the minimum contacts analysis

Truck VIN 1GCHK33M9CI43129, 810 F.2d 178, 183 (8th Cir. 1987) ("[Tlhe full panoply of constitutional
protections afforded criminal defendants is not available in the context of such forfeiture proceedings.")
(citation omitted); see also Sharon Finegan, The False Claims Act and CorporateCriminal Liability: Qui Tam
Actions, Corporate Integrity Agreements and the Overlap of Criminal and Civil Law, 111 PENN ST. L. REV.
625, 635-36 (2007).
102. Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 460 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing the civil
forfeiture category of "tools or instrumentalities ... used in the commission of a crime").
103. See Thomas R.-Lee, In Rem Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 75 WASH. L. REV. 97, 126 & n.154
(2000).
104. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A); Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsche.Net, 302 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2002)
(upholding the constitutionality of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA)'s in rem
jurisdictional provisions). But see Catherine T. Struve & R. Polk Wagner, Realspace Sovereigns in Cyberspace:
Problems with the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 989 (2002) (arguing
that in no cases of foreign cybersquatting would the in rem provision of the ACPA be both applicable and
constitutional). See generally EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 302-05 (4th ed. 2004).

See Lee, supra note 103, at 126-37 (arguing that domain names have their situs where the registrar
controlling the property is located).
See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 n.37 (1977).
95 U.S. 714 (1877).
495 U.S. 604 (1990).
Id. at 619; see also 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1073 (2d ed. 1987 & Supp. 1999); Lee, supra note 103, at 137-41.
105.
or registry
106.
107.
108.
109.
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applicable to in personam proceedings." ° But even so, the minimum contacts test
is not a serious hurdle. Foreign registrants registering a name in a gTLD with a
U.S. based registry purposefully avail themselves of the laws and protections of a
U.S. jurisdiction, thus satisfying the "purposeful availment" test."' Moreover,
this "purposeful availment" may not even be required. Many commentators
suggest that personal jurisdiction may be based on objective analyses of effects in
the United States rather than a subjective analysis of "purposeful availment.'"'2
This section illustrates that the existing common law, as well as a statute
following the jurisdictional framework of the ACPA, would permit either an
aggrieved party or the U.S. government to bring an in rem action against a
domain name, whether held by a foreign or domestic holder, as long as the

110. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212 ("[A]II assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated
according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny."). Justice Scalia in Burnham
acknowledged that the approach in Burnham departed from this statement in Shaffer, but also noted that this
statement was dicta. See Lee, supra note 104, at 139. Fewer contacts may be required to establish in rem
jurisdiction because of the limited relief available to in rem plaintiffs. See Adam M. Greenfield, Reviving the
Distinction Between In Rem and In Personam Jurisdiction by way of the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer
ProtectionAct, 35 AIPLA Q.J. 29, 64-66 (2007).
111. See Lee, supra note 103, at 143. A broader argument of "purposeful availment" that allows
sovereign states to exercise jurisdiction over foreign defendants is based on geolocation capabilities and
interactivity. Geolocation technology allows online actors to "match an individual user's [IP] address ... to a
geographical location." Calson Analytics, Security & InfoCrime Guide: Geolocation, July, 2005,
http://www.caslon.com.au/securityguidel5.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2008). Similarly, geolocation filtering
permits an online publisher to vary or restrict the content of her website based on a users' geographical location.
See Wayne Madsen, Internet Censorship: The Warning Signs Were Not Hidden, INFOWARS, Dec. 9, 2005,
available at http://www.prisonplanet.com/articles/december2005/091205nothidden.htm. Professor Reidenberg
concludes that this technology "mean[s] that Internet activity is 'purposefully availing' throughout the Internet
whenever content is posted without geolocation filtering." Joel R. Reidenberg, Technology and Internet
Jurisdiction, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1951, 1956 (2005). Further, "[tlechnological innovation that enhances
interactivity also shifts the burden from demonstrating that a jurisdiction was targeted to showing that
reasonable efforts were made to avoid contact with the jurisdiction." Id. at 1962.
112. See Floyd & Baradaran-Robison, supra note 92 at 604 (arguing "for a unified test for personal
jurisdiction based on an objective evaluation of the defendant's activities with regard to the forum state");
Wendy Perdue, Aliens, the Internet, and "Purposeful Availment": A Reassessment of Fifth Amendment Limits
on Personal Jurisdiction,98 Nw. U. L. REV. 455 (2004) (arguing that the limits under the Fifth Amendment are
different from those under the Fourteenth Amendment based on a difference in the limitations on sovereign
authority in the two clauses); see also Reidenberg, supra note 11, at 1955, (listing cases that "have looked to
online targeting and to deleterious effects within the forum to determine if personal jurisdiction is appropriate");
Michael Geist, Cyberlaw 2.0, 44 B.C. L. REV. 323, 332-47 (2003). Courts are also using an effects
jurisdictional analysis in other areas of law such as security regulation. See, e.g., Consol. Gold Fields PLC v.
Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 255, 261-64 (2d Cir. 1989), amended by 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989) (applying
"effects" to conclude under federal securities laws that a tender offer of securities by foreign entities had
"sufficient effects within the United States" to permit the district court's exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction
over the parties ) (citing Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cit. 1968), reh'g on other grounds, 405
F.2d 215 (in banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 991 (2d
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 402(1)(c) (1987)) (citations omitted).
Internationally, courts are relying on an effects analysis as well. See, e.g., Dow Jones & Co. v. Gumick
(2002) 210 C.L.R. 575 [Austl.], available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2002/56.html
(Australia); Richardson v. Schwarzenegger, 2004 EWHC 2422 (Q.B. Oct. 29, 2004), available at http://portal.
nasstar.com/75/files/Richardson-v-Schwarzenegger%2OQBD%2029%20Oct%202004.pdf.

2008 / Choosing "to Play Internet Ball in American Cyberspace
foreign domain name holder uses either a domestic registrar or (almost) any
gTLD. The reach of this jurisdiction extends to all websites using .biz, .com,
.info, .int, .name, .net, .org, or .pro."3 However, this approach would not permit
jurisdiction in the United States over two of the five largest ccTLDs, .uk and
.de,"14 and these domain holders would not be subject to suit in the United States
unless they used a U.S. registrar or otherwise had contacts with the United States.
If support for pornography regulation and in rem jurisdiction were to be garnered
in England and Germany, most of the world's Internet traffic would be subject to
the take down order of a court with in rem jurisdiction.
2. Injunctive Reach
Once a court has jurisdiction over the domain name registrant, whether
foreign or domestic, the court must still issue an order that will be effective to
reach the registrar or registrant with the contractual obligations discussed above
in Part II.A. A U.S. federal court's ability to enforce an injunction is informed by
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) § 65(d). In this section, we will first
discuss the injunction mechanism generally and then examine injunctive reach as
it relates to four types of entities involved in providing and regulating domain
names on the Internet-registrars, registries, regional Internet registries, and
entities involved with ccTLDs.
a. General Injunctive Reach
Section 65(d) of the FRCP provides that an order granting an injunction
"binds only the following who receive actual notice of it by personal service or
otherwise ... (A) the parties; (B)

the parties'

officers, agents, servants,

employees, and attorneys; and (C) other persons who are in active concert or
participation with anyone described [above]."...5 Thus, the general rule is that
nonparties are not usually bound by injunctions. However, U.S. courts have held
that "a significant exception occurs where a nonparty has actual notice of a
restraining order and is in active concert or participation with a party or his
privy."" 6 This "active concert or participation" language has been interpreted to
include "situations where a nonparty with actual notice aids or abets a named

113. See supranote 98.
114.

VeriSign, The VeriSign Domain Report, 3 DOMAIN NAME INDUSTRY BRIEF 1, 2 (Nov. 2006),

available at http://www.verisign.com/static/O40029.pdf ("In terms of total registrations, the five largest TLDs
are .com, the German ccTLD (.de), net, the British ccTLD (.uk) and .org.").
115. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 65(d)(2); see also Ronald I. Mirvis, Annotation, Who, Under Rule 65(d) of
FederalRules of Civil Procedure,are Persons "in Active Concert or Participation"with Parties to Action so as
to be Bound by Order Granting Injunction, 61 A.L.R. FED. 482 (1983).
116. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Mast Constr. Co. 84 F.3d 372, 374, 377 (10th Cir. 1996); see also Goya Foods,
Inc. v. Wallack Management Co., 290 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2002); Mirvis, supra note 115, at 482 § 6[a] (collecting
cases).
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defendant or his privy in violating the order."' 7 For example, if a bank has actual
notice of an order prohibiting all financial institutions with actual notice of the
order from permitting a corporate officer to withdraw funds, but nonetheless
8
allows withdrawals, the bank has aided and abetted the officer under this rule."
Similarly, a registrar may not be a party to litigation over a website's content.
Nevertheless, even if the registrar is a nonparty, a court's injunctive power vis- vis the registrar is informed by this "active concert or participation" analysis.
Thus, a registrar or registry with actual notice of an injunction served on a party
to the action would be required to affirmatively enforce the injunction by taking
down a domain name or web site.
b. Injunctions OrderingAction by Registrars
In the trademark context, at least one court has found that its injunctive
power reaches domestic non-party registrars based on FRCP § 65(d)'s "active
concert or participation" language and based on the registrar's contractual
obligation to enforce court orders." 9 In a case brought in the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Worldsport Networks Ltd. v. ArtInternet
S.A., a French company admitted to infringing on an Irish corporation's
trademark by using the domain name "worldsport.com."' 20 The court noted that,
since the parties stipulated that the plaintiff's trademark rights were violated, the
defendants should be enjoined from future violation.' 2' As the defendants
"committed these violations in part through the registration and naming of their
website," the registrar Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI) "acted in concert with
Defendants in violating Plaintiff's trademark rights.' 22 The court held that it
possessed authority to order NSI to transfer registration of the domain name from
the defendants to the plaintiff, even though NSI acted "unwittingly and without
culpability.' 23
Critics of this expanded view argue that this reasoning may be dicta because
NSI did not object to the injunction and had a policy which required it to obey a
court's final order without being made. a party to the litigation.' 24 NSI had, in fact,

117.

Reliance, 84 F.3d at 377.

118.

Id.

119. Worldsport Networks Ltd. v. ArtInternet, S.A., No. CIV. A. 99-CV-0616, 1999 WL 269719, at *1
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 1999). This case is unpublished, but it is a useful source of analysis on this point.
120.

Id.

121. See id. at*3.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See id. at *1-*3 (describing these provisions of NSI's Domain Name Dispute Policy as providing
that "when presented with proof of a valid trademark and proof that one of its customers has breached this
warranty of non-infringement, it will respect the rights of trademark holders and place the disputed domain
name on 'hold' status [and] that NSI will abide by all temporary and final Court Orders directing the disposition
of a domain name without being named as a party to the litigation").
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reminded the plaintiff of that policy.'25 In addition, after the court concluded that
NSI's role as registrar was sufficient to be considered "in active concert or
participation" with the infringing defendants, the court noted that "NSI has
consented to this exercise of the Court's authority.' 26
Whether the court's FRCP § 65(d) analysis is dicta or not, both readings of
the case are interesting here. NSI's Domain Name Dispute Policy, controlling at
the time of this case, indicated that it would obey a court order without being
made a party to the litigation; this policy is similar if not identical to ICANN's
current requirement that registrars cancel a registration upon receipt of a court
order directing it to do so. 27 Thus, even if the language quoted above is dicta, the
existing ICANN contracts provide the same alternate basis for relief as that relied
upon in Worldsport.
Requiring "innocent" registrars by injunction to suspend domain names for
offending web content is not dissimilar to requiring "innocent" registrars to
suspend domain names used by publishers of other offending content. The
Worldsport court reasoned that an injunction requiring registrars to transfer a
domain name is authorized by FRCP § 65(d) and is also supported by the
Lanham Act, 28 which "recognizes that even newspapers, magazines and
periodicals, as well as printers, may be enjoined from innocent infringement of
another's mark as to future publication."'' 29 An injunction requiring a registrar to
suspend a domain name that hosts obscene content under U.S. obscenity law
would also be covered by FRCP § 65(d). And, similar to the Lanham Act, federal
obscenity law allows the enjoining of publishers and printers from future
infringement and also permits the civil and criminal forfeiture of "any property,
real or personal, used or intended to be used to commit or to promote the
commission of [an] offense" involving obscene material. 30 If the United States
were to adopt a measure proscribing the publishing of material harmful to
minors'-including obscenity, child pornography, and pornography that does
not satisfy the Miller obscenity test 1 32-jurisdiction and the mechanisms for
enforcement of injunctions to remove such content, even if published overseas,
are already largely available.
Furthermore, in the Internet pornography context, an injunction may be
honored by a registrar without the necessity of resorting to the "active concert or
participation" exception for nonparties. Section 230 of the Communications
125.
126.
127.

See id. at*l *2.
Id.
See supra Part II.A.

128.

15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2000).

129. See 15 U.S.C. § 11 14(2)(A); Worldsport Networks Ltd. 1999 WL 269719, at *3; Coca-Cola Co. v.
Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1193 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
130. 18 U.S.C. § 1467(a), (c).
131. For an example of proposed regulation, see Cheryl B. Preston, Making a Family-friendly Internet a
Reality: The Internet Community PortsAct, 2007 BYU L. REV. 147 1.

132.

See supra, note 100.
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Decency Act,"' upheld by the Supreme Court, contains a provision which
addresses a similar issue. 34 Section 230 protects a "provider or user" of an
"interactive computer service" 3 _-such as a registrar, registry, or ISP-from
liability for actions taken in good faith to "restrict access to or availability of
material that [it considers] to be ... objectionable" even if the material is
constitutionally protected. 36 Therefore, under this provision, a registrar that

restricts access to the objectionable material by suspending a domain name in
good faith compliance with a court order is not liable to the domain name holder.
Although this provision does not force a registrar to act, the protection from
liability for suspending or canceling a domain name may encourage the registrar
to take down a site subject to court action without being legally required to do
137
SO.

c.

Injunctions OrderingAction by Registries

Another approach to this problem would be to duplicate, in an antipornography law, the statutory approach in the ACPA discussed above. The
ACPA allows the filing of an in rem action "in the judicial district in which the
domain name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain name authority
that registered or assigned the domain name is located" under various
conditions.' Legislation that enforces pornography standards and that parallels
the ACPA would allow for the suspension of offending domain names through
court orders directed at registries (the entities in charge of TLDs), not just

133. 47 U.S.C. § 230.
134. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 861-64 (1997) (holding unconstitutional §§ 223(a)(1) and 223(d) of
the Communications Decency Act under the First Amendment, but upholding other provisions of the Act
including § 230).
135. Section 230 defines "interactive computer service" as follows: "any information service, system, or
access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server,
including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or
services offered by libraries or educational institutions." 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2).
136. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c); Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003).
137. Executive action is another method in which a domestic registrar may be required to suspend or
cancel a foreign registrant's domain name. See Adam Liptak, A Wave of the Watch List, and Speech
Disappears, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/04/us/04bar.html. The
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the U.S. Treasury Department maintains a list, known as the
Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list, listing individuals and organizations that U.S. citizens and
permanent residents are prohibited from doing business with and whose assets are blocked. See U.S. TreasuryOffice of Foreign Assets Control, Frequently Asked Questions and Answers, http://www.treas.gov/offices/
enforcement/ofac/faq/answer.shtml#17 (last visited Mar. 27, 2008). The websites were frozen because the travel
agency owning the website was identified as a Cuban national and U.S. companies must freeze all governmental
and private Cuban assets. See U.S. State Department, Treasury Dept. Identifies Cuban Travel Agency Targeting
U.S. Tourists, Dec. 8, 2004, http://usinfo.state.gov/wh/Archive/2006/Dec/08-868923.html; See also OFFICE OF
FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, CUBA: WHAT You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE U.S. EMBARGO: AN OVERVIEW OF
THE CUBAN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS-TITLE 31 PART 515 OF THE U.S. CODE OF FEDERAL

1-2 (2004), http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcementofac/programs/cuba/cuba.pdf.
15 U.S.C. § l125(d)(2)(A).

REGULATIONS

138.
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registrars (the entities that sell domain names). By this method a foreign domain
name holder, registered through a foreign registrar, may still be subject to a U.S.
court's injunction when using a registry headquartered in the United States.'39
A number of courts have upheld this application of the ACPA to registries as
well as registrars. For example, in Globalsantafe Corporation v.
Globalsantafe.com, the Eastern District of Virginia held that the remedy of
suspending the domain name of a foreign registrant through a foreign registrar
was appropriate under the ACPA.140 In Globalsantafe, a trademark owner brought
an infringement action under the ACPA against an alleged cybersquatter located
in Korea. 4 ' The district court had previously ordered a Korean registrar,
Hangang, and VeriSign Global Registry Services (VeriSign) to transfer the
contested domain name. A Korean court issued an injunction prohibiting
Hangang from transferring the name. The trademark owner then moved to amend
the order to direct VeriSign4 2 to cancel the domain name until it could be
transferred under Korean law.'
The Eastern District of Virginia determined first that both cancellation and
transfer of the domain name are authorized remedies under ACPA and then
analyzed the appropriateness of the requested relief given the specific facts of the
case.'4 3 The court appeared cautious in extending its reach beyond the Korean
registrar to a higher level in the DNS, the U.S. based registry VeriSign, even
though the ACPA's language refers to both the registrar and the registry.'" The
court considered the expansive jurisdictional reach of the ACPA, noting that
VeriSign headquarters were in the court's district and the popularity of the .com
and .net TLD names administered by VeriSign meant that this court would likely
45
be asked to assert jurisdiction over domain names owned all over the world.'
Nonetheless, the court asserted jurisdiction.

139. See supra note 98.
140. 250 F. Supp. 2d 610, 617 (E.D. Va. 2003).
141. Id. at 612-13.
142. Id. at 613-14.
143. Id. at 617-24.
144. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A) (2006) (allowing filing of an in rem action "in the judicial
district in which the domain name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain name authority that
registered or assigned the domain name is located").
145. Globalsantafe, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 623. The court noted that this aggressive assertion of jurisdiction
might cause segmentation of the DNS or the use of ccTLDs, which would impede enforcement of U.S.
trademark law on the Internet. Id. at 623-24.
Perhaps due to these concerns, the court discussed three possible methods of canceling the domain name.
First, the registrar could use a delete command that would direct the registry to delete the information from the
Registry Database and the top-level domain zone file. Id. at 617, 620-21. Second, the registry could unilaterally
disable the domain name. This would put the domain name on hold and make it inactive. Third, the registry
could delete the registration information and remove the domain name from the top-level domain zone file upon
court order. Id. at 617-18, 620-22. These methods involve different kinds of actions and degrees of
intrusiveness.
In the Globalsantafe case, VeriSign resisted an order requiring the last method because such an order
would cause VeriSign to "violate its contracts with the registrar and with ICANN and to interfere with the
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The Globalsantafe opinion is significant, first, because it shows that a court
will extend its jurisdictional and enforcement reach up the DNS hierarchy to
registries even when doing so subjects a large number of domain names held by
foreign registrants through foreign registrars to jurisdiction in U.S. courts. This
decision therefore subjects nearly all registrants of gTLDs to jurisdiction in the
United States even though they have contracted
with a foreign registrar, because
46
the registries are located in the United States.
Second, the decision disregards the barriers that ICANN's governance
structure has tried to develop to isolate certain functions, here registry functions,
at specific levels of the governance hierarchy. "' Third, the decision shows that a
U.S. court may require registries located in the United States to unilaterally
delete and even unilaterally transfer 4 8 domain name registrations in the face of
resistant foreign registrars and, more significantly, in the face of a foreign court's
injunction not to transfer the domain name.
Some criticize the Globalsantafe decision because it fails to take account of
the added complexity resulting from the diversity of the parties and the
conflicting courts involved. 49 The only reason the Globalsantafecourt engaged
in an international-comity analysis instead of a full choice-of-law analysis was

registrar-registrant contract" by "acting as a registrar" as prohibited by VeriSign's contract with ICANN. Id. at
622. The court was unconvinced by this argument because it was not clear that transferring or canceling a
domain name in response to a court order would violate the contract language. Id. Second, VeriSign might no
longer be bound by a contract with the registrar, Hangang, when the registrar had breached its duties under the
contract. Third, these contracts do not limit the remedies available under federal law. Id. at 622-23. The court
reasoned that all three methods were appropriate under the ACPA, but that the least intrusive method in this
case was to order VeriSign to disable the domain name. Id. at 623, 626-27. The first method was not available
since the Korean registrar Hangang was not cooperating due to a conflicting injunction issued by a Korean
court. Id. at 626.
146. See supra note 98.
147. See Globalsantafe, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 623-24, for a summary of the court's reasons for finding that
it could order a registry (VeriSign) to remove a domain name from a top-level domain zone file. The court
indicated its willingness to enforce the statutory rights of trademark holders, even if such enforcement entailed
asserting jurisdiction over a registry and overriding contracts within the ICANN hierarchy. "Simply put, the
interest in vindicating congressionally provided trademark rights trumps contract." Globalsantafe,250 F. Supp.
2d at 623. See also infra notes 158-59 and accompanying text, arguing that the differences between registrars
and registries are largely artificial.
148. See Globalsantafe, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 622-23 (discussing, but not deciding, the question of
whether the court could order a registry's unilateral deletion or transfer of a domain name); see also America
Online, Inc. v. Aol.org, 259 F. Supp. 2d 449, 453-57 (E.D. Va. 2003). In America Online Inc., the court
extended the holding of Globalsantafe and actually ordered a registry to unilaterally transfer a domain name,
reasoning that the only additional complexity arising from the order would involve coordination between the
trademark owner/acquiring registrant and a registrar, which registrar could be chosen by the acquiring
registrant. Id. at 455.
149. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Redefining
Governmental Interests in a Global Era, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1819, 1823-34 (2005) (critiquing the
Globalsantafe decision for being "founded solely on jurisdictional power and a race to the courthouse" and for
not considering South Korean trademark law).
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because it was confronted with a foreign litigant and a foreign court that was
exercising jurisdiction over the case. "0
In other cases with similar choice-of-law issues, the foreign domain name
holder owned assets in the country where the lawsuit was filed. For example, in
both the French Yahoo! 5 and the Australian Dow Jones defamation cases, 52 the
foreign corporations, Yahoo! and Dow Jones, held assets in France and Australia,
respectively, where the alleged harms occurred. The contacts created by these
assets perhaps provided better justification for the French and Australian courts
to assert jurisdiction because the foreign corporations could have avoided the
reach of French and Australian law by not owning assets in those countries. In
Globalsantafe, however, the foreign registrant's only asset within the United
States was the domain name itself,"3 a fact which nonetheless provided enough
justification for the court to assert jurisdiction. Like the foreign corporations in
the Yahoo! and Dow Jones cases, the foreign registrant in Globalsantafe could
have decided to avoid the reach of U.S. law by not owning any asset, including a
domain name, in the United States.
At first glance, the results of Globalsantafe might seem to conflict with
international-comity analyses and may also seem to be unfair to foreign
registrants who want to take advantage of the popular .com, .org, and .net TLDs
for their websites. However, the principles used in Globalsantafe-includinga
sovereign state's application of domestic law to an entity with an asset within its
borders-are found in other conflicts-of-law and choice-of-law contexts, thus
illustrating that the Internet context is unexceptional. 4 Furthermore, the
5
popularity of a TLD should not provide a justification for relaxing jurisdiction.'
Additionally, in a subsequent case following Globalsantafe's reasoning, the
Eastern District of Virginia responded directly to the argument that an order
requiring a U.S. registry to delete or transfer a domain name is unfair to foreign
registrants. The district court replied that, when the registrants registered a .org

150. See id.
151. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme (L.I.C.R.A.) and L'Union des Etudiants juifs de
France (U.E.J.F.) v. Yahoo! Inc., Interim Court Order, The County Court of Paris 6, May 22, 2000. The original
order and an English translation can be found in the Appendix to the Complaint for Declaratory Relief in
Yahoo! Inc. v. L.I.C.R.A., 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001), http://w2.eff.org/legal/Jurisdictionand
_sovereignty/LICRA v_Yahoo/20001221_yahoous complaint.pdf (last visited June 7, 2007). For background
on both the French Yahoo! case and the Australian Dow Jones case, see GOLDSMITH & wu, supra note 2, at 110, 147-61.
152. Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick, (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575 (Austl.), available at http:/www.
austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2002/56.html.
153. That is, assuming one considers a domain name in a gTLD registry based in the United States as
being a U.S. asset and assuming that one considers a domain name to be an asset or property-both of which
are debatable but are not discussed here.
154. GOLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 2, at 159-60 (referencing conflicts-of-law issues faced by
multinational organizations in matters of healthcare, tax, consumer protection, and libel).
155. The popularity of the .de top-level domain does not require Germany to relax its jurisdictional law
for British citizens, and vice versa for German citizens and the popular uk top-level domain.
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domain name with a U.S. registry, they "chose, in effect, to play Internet ball in
American cyberspace."' 5 6 The registrants must know or reasonably should know
that under the ACPA a federal court in Virginia has jurisdiction over all .org
domain names. 1 7 In addition, foreign registrants who wish to avoid the
jurisdiction of U.S. courts may register their domain names in a ccTLD for which
both the registry and the registrar are located outside the United States.
The reasoning in Globalsantafe also seems to extend the reach of a court's
injunctive power under FRCP § 65(d). Even in the absence of a statute such as
the ACPA, which specifically allows this in rem jurisdiction, a registry, as well
as a registrar, should fall within FRCP § 65(d)'s "active concert or participation"
analysis because the difference between registrars and registries are largely
artificial.' 58 One indication of this essentially artificial difference is the fact that
NSI, the organization that preceded ICANN in administering domain names,
performed both the duties of registrars and the duties of registries: NSI sold all
the domain names in certain gTLDs, which later became the registrar function,
and also administered the registry databases for those domains, which later
became the registry function. It was only when governance functions were
transferred to ICANN that ICANN and the DoC began to allow other entities to
sell domain names as registrars in competition with NSI, with NSI continuing to
act as the registry.'59 Although this event separated the registrar and registry
function formally, these functions still could be performed by the same entity.
d. Injunctions OrderingAction by Regional Registries
Courts have also been willing to enjoin regional Internet registries.' 6 In 2001,
the Northern District of California issued an injunction ordering action by the
American Registry of Internet Numbers (ARIN), the regional Internet registry for
North America. The injunction was part of a long dispute over the domain name
sex.com in the case of Kremen v. Cohen. 6' In 2006, Kremen brought a lawsuit to
enforce the order and also alleged antitrust violations by ARIN. ARIN responded
by challenging the court's power to issue the 2001 injunction under FRCP
§ 65(d) and requested, in the alternative, a clarification of the court's order.
Although the court did not reach the merits of the antitrust allegations,' 62 it did
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clarify the order by directing the transfer of the IP numbers within ARIN's

control.

63

The case illustrates how far a court's injunctive power might extend up the
DNS hierarchy, even to compel action by non-party regional Internet registries.
Although regional Internet registries will not usually be involved in the
enforcement of content, the case suggests that U.S. courts may order even high
non-party actors in the DNS to transfer Internet resources. More generally, these
cases demonstrate that nation-states will regulate regional Internet registries to
the extent of their ability and that the geographic location of Internet resources is
often determinative in which nation-state will regulate those resources.
e.

Injunctions Involving Country-Code Top-Level Domains

As noted above, although almost all gTLDs have registries in the United
States, ccTLDs do not. Regulating ccTLDs sites for content will require relying
on the judicial systems of each individual country in which such registries are
located, unless there is some other manner of establishing minimum contacts
with the United States.
III. CONCLUSION
The contractual provisions imposed by ICANN, the administrator of the
DNS, provide an avenue to enforce national laws regarding Internet content,
most notably laws aimed at protecting children from Internet pornography. As
head of the DNS, ICANN has substantial power over Internet actors, including
registrars who sell domain names, registries who maintain databases of domain
names, and regional Internet registries who allocate IP addresses. It has used this
authority to implement not only technical policy, but also non-technical policy,
largely at the encouragement of trademark interests.
ICANN has in place an elaborate structure of contracts and memorandums of
understanding, as well as informal agreements, with many actors in the Internet
hierarchy. These agreements contain the broad requirement that registrars must
suspend, cancel, or transfer a domain name when ordered to do so by a court or
when such action is required by ICANN in order to resolve disputes. This
language in these ICANN-mandated contracts is sufficient to require suspension
of a website upon receipt of a court order arising from the violation of an antipornography law.
An understanding of the contractual rights and duties among members of the
DNS provides lawmakers and public interest groups with a framework around
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which to craft enforcement mechanisms for laws regulating Internet content.
Statutes providing for court orders to take down websites or forfeit domain
names could be highly effective.
For such orders to be effective in the United States, a court must have
jurisdiction over the parties and the ability to issue injunctions against non-party
Internet actors. As we have seen, both of these requirements can be satisfied with
regard to websites in nearly every gTLD. Domestic U.S. registrants are subject to
in personam jurisdiction in the state and federal courts in the districts where they
are domiciled and where they have minimum contacts. Foreign registrants
registered with a domestic registrar are subject to jurisdiction in U.S. courts
under ICANN's Registrar Accreditation Agreement, which requires that a
registrar compel a domain name holder to submit to jurisdiction where the
registrar is located. Foreign registrants of a domain name in a gTLD-including
those registered with a foreign registrar-would fall within the jurisdiction of
U.S. courts if Congress were to pass a statute with a jurisdictional scheme similar
to the ACPA. Alternatively, U.S. courts may exercise jurisdiction over such
registrants without new legislation through an in rem civil or criminal forfeiture
action.
In addition, U.S. courts can issue injunctions against the primary entities
involved in providing and regulating domain names on the Internet-registrars,
registries, and regional Internet registries-under the "active concert or participation" language in FRCP § 65(d), with or even without legislation like the
ACPA. Since the registries for ccTLDs are located outside the United States,
however, these domain names would not be subject to jurisdiction in the United
States.
Thus, the two major hurdles to the effective use of court orders in bringing
down pornographic websites in most gTLDs-problems of jurisdiction and
injunctive reach-are indeed surmountable. Opponents of pornography regulation in the United States frequently cite the inability to address pornography
served offshore as the reason why it would be futile, or unconstitu-tional, to enact
a statute regulating material harmful to minors. '64 But as this paper illustrates,
tools for enforcing national pornography and obscenity laws already exist in
ICANN's contractual structure. In addition, new technology such as geolocation
filtering is removing some of the borderless nature of the Internet and rendering
obsolete many of the rationales for limited jurisdiction over Internet actors. The
failure of the United States to enact reasonable legislative regulation of the
harmful pornography that has proliferated on the net is now inexcusable. If the
United States is to retain its status as a leader in the development of civilization,
especially in conceiving of ways to balance freedom and order, it must address

164. See, e.g., ACLU v. Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d 775, 810 (2007) (holding that the Children's Online
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the new (but also archetypal and historical) conflicts of values that arise in the
new world of cyberspace.
Finally, the United States did not just create the Internet, but also created its
governing structure and charged ICANN with governing power. ICANN's hands
are covered with non-technical policy choices, and it is now disingenuous to
argue that ICANN cannot or should not help to mitigate the problem of Internet
pornography. As ICANN has helped the big-roller money interests in protecting
commercial values, such as trademarks, it can now certainly help save childhood
for children.

